1 Boast Street
Eshowe
KwaZulu-Natal
19 March 2015

COE and Information Officer Vidhu Vedalankar
Legal Aid South Africa
29 De Beer Street
Braamfontein

Per email and per registered post

Dear Ms Vedalankar

NATIONAL DEPUTY INFORMATION OFFICERS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 2 OF 2000 ('PAIA');

REQUEST FOR YOUR INTERVENTION UNDER SECTION 17;

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO APPLY TO THE HIGH COURT TO COMPEL UNDER SECTION 78

FURTHER PAIA REQUEST ADDRESSED TO YOU UNDER SECTION 18, ENCLOSED.

1. Your national office deputy information officers Chief Legal Executive Patrick Hundermark, Chief Operations Officer Jerry Makokoane, and National Operations Brian Nair have all unlawfully failed to comply with my PAIA requests addressed to them in November 2014 (with one amendment in December), in contravention of the Act and in violation of my fundamental civil right to freedom of information guaranteed by section 32 in the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.

2. Subsequent to the expiry in January of the extended sixty calendar days allowed them to respond to my requests, to which I'd generously consented under section 26(1)(e), knowing they wanted to go away on their Christmas holiday – which is to say they were already out of extra time and therefore unlawfully non-compliant with the Act – Hundermark and Makokoane unlawfully demanded money from me, purportedly under section 22 (while failing to comply with subsection 3).

3. Hundermark's claim is for reading (both himself, 'me', and other staff, 'we'):

- ‘the bundle of documents relating to the proceedings of the Labour Court’ (in fact, there were numerous different bundles, including two volumes of documents admitted into the evidence comprising 1073 pages in all);
- my three pending ‘applications in the Magistrate’s Court’ to compel you and your Eastern Cape- and Free State and North West regional information officers to comply with my PAIA requests which you all illegally refused in November 2013; and,
- my ‘specific requests as outlined in’ the annexures to my Form A PAIA requests addressed to him, listing the documents I require or, where they don’t exist, sworn certification of this under section 23.

4. They spent 187 hours reading these, Hundermark said.
5. He doesn’t say whether he and his staff all read all these thousands of pages of documents, thereby multiplying the effort; or whether they divided them up and shared them out, with each of them reading different bundles to lighten the load, thus resulting in each of them being half-educated about my labour case against LASA and my applications to court to disgorge illegally withheld documents from it.
6. Nor does he say whether the very many hours of reading he claims they all did included taking a few minutes out to read the Act.
7. I sent Hundermark two requests.
8. With a couple of exceptions, the first request concerned the Durban Justice Centre’s Children’s Court Practitioner post, which featured nowhere in my labour case or my applications to compel you and your regional deputy information officers’ compliance with my November 2013 PAIA requests.
9. The exceptions, items 20–23, are:
    - Hundermark’s delegation as deputy information officer;
    - a copy of my recommendation for the Pietermaritzburg Senior Litigator post in November 2009, in a form less redacted than one you eventually very reluctantly surrendered to me under SAHRC pressure in January 2011, five months after I requested it in August 2010, after first mutely, and then expressly, illegally refusing to allow me to see it, not wanting me to read that I’d indeed been selected and recommended for the post, and no one else, contrary to your lie to

me in October 2010 that I'd been 'recommended together with other candidates', even as you refused me sight of the recommendation refuting your lie;

- two documents that I want Hundermark to certify on oath don't exist, thereby providing me with his sworn evidence about this to tender later on:
  - the letter (strangely not) sent former Labour Court judge Mzochithwayo Ngcamu, now Durban Children's Court Practitioner, after his interview for the Pietermaritzburg or Durban Senior Litigator post in November 2009, to inform him that he'd been unsuccessful, as section '1.5 Unsuccessful candidates' of LASA's Recruitment code required be sent to him; and,
  - the letter (strangely not) sent Ncgamu in August 2010 (after I asked you in July 2010 to see to the finalisation of my appointment, now eight months after my interview) alleging that it had been decided not to fill the KwaZulu-Natal Senior Litigator posts. (In my labour case, LASA pleaded that letters to this effect were sent me and two other interviewed applicants, not all three; and later furnished me with copies of the letters sent me and two of the other candidates, Mngadi and van Wyk, but not also the third, Ngcamu.)

10. So as you can see, Hundermark and whoever else he's referring to had no reason to read the perfectly irrelevant stacks of papers he alleges they did, for which many hours they allegedly spent reading them all he insists I must first hand over my money before he'll respond to my PAIA requests.

11. My second request addressed to Hundermark comprised a mere four items and required no background reading to respond to either, because on sight of them he'd have appreciated instantly that Nair's evidence implicating him, quoted from the trial transcript in the request, was perjured.

12. After I'd exposed, in my original very detailed statement of claim in July 2011, and had refuted as lies,

    (i) the false budgetary excuse you fed me in your October 2010 and January 2011 letters, and very unwisely confirmed under oath in your PAIA confirmatory affidavit in April 2011 (expecting your cover-story about this would put me off pursuing my appointment), and fed also to the Minister and to Parliament in the secret reports Nair ghost-wrote for you to pass on to Board chairperson Mlambo JP to sign and give them to pervert their enquiries into my complaints that you'd repeatedly illegally refused to comply with my PAIA requests and had irregularly aborted my appointment (initially he dishonestly disputed (in cross-examination

of me) being the ghost-writer, but in his evidence later admitted it, cornerered by his electronic fingerprints ('Briann') left behind at the scene of the crime in the 'Author' properties folder of the PDF of the report to the Minister, finally surrendered to me in the final few days before trial, nearly two years after I first requested it, and never stopped requesting it);

(ii) the additional false logistical excuse to patch a gaping hole in the financial one fed the latter authorities, via the secret reports (that I obtained by chance), for not proceeding to finalise my appointment, namely that difficulty had been encountered coordinating the so-called second round interview panel to (irregularly) interview me again (in truth and fact, as he testified, Nair took no action on receiving my recommendation, and no one was contacted to establish their availability to conduct the second interview – Nair twice retracted the lie on affidavit before the case, then revived it in court on oath, then contradicted it on oath),

Nair changed these stories completely, and in November 2011 told the Board totally different new lies about why he'd not finalised the Senior Litigator appointments, namely 'recruitment challenges' (in truth and in fact, there weren't any: three good candidates had been selected for the three posts, one already a Senior Litigator seeking a transfer closer to home) and alleged uncertainty over LASA's incumbent Senior Litigators' professional competence, which was therefore to be audited immediately by a special assessment panel 'including possibly a retired judge' (in truth and in fact, all classes of LASA practitioners had consistently and repeatedly been found to be performing well; and no such panel has ever been convened) causing executive management to hold recruitment to the remaining vacant Senior Litigator posts.

13. And as these new different lies Nair told the Board – different from the lies told me, the Minister and Parliament – were unravelling under my cross-examination of him in court, he amplified his perjury to make it sound more convincing by falsely implicating Hundermark in his lies.

14. Obviously, had Nair told the truth in court and not gushed the new lies quoted in my request, like a child caught stealing and frantically inventing stories to escape a beating, the documents requested would exist, and would be available for Hundermark to give me.

15. On sight of my second request, Hundermark appreciated immediately that Nair had perjured himself and that the documents I'd specified don't exist; and he was placed to certify this under section 23 on the spot.

16. Hundermark appreciated immediately that a section 23 affidavit by him disposing of my second request would be going straight to the police and to the NDPP as evidence of Nair's perjury for his criminal prosecution; to the Board for his dismissal; to the GCB for his strike-off; and to court for the reopening of my labour case, which miscarried directly on account of Nair's prolific, childishly contradictory perjuries about why he didn't act to finalise my appointment. (The judge recorded his finding that I'd demonstrated that Nair was 'not generous with the truth' on 'a number' of scores, without specifying his lies, even as he then believed every lie he told all the same, and tossed my case on the strength of his lies, some novel and not pleaded, others diametrically contradicting LASA's pleadings and sworn case in its interlocutory affidavits.)

17. Do you think while obstructing my exercise of my fundamental right of access to your public body records, or failing to certify they don't exist as required by section 23, to protect Nair from being sacked, struck-off, prosecuted and jailed for his lies told to me, to the Board, to the Minister, to Parliament and to court to defeat the ends of justice and pervert the true and juste determination of my claim, Hundermark was trying to extort money from me illegally with lies of his own – about reading all those completely irrelevant documents he alleged that he and his staff needed to read before he could respond to my requests?

18. I must wonder about Hundermark's personal and professional integrity and the extent of his complicity in this next leviathan scandal in all the newspapers, because who can ever forget:

    - his emailed assurance to the director of the SAHRC's PAIA Unit on 4 October 2010, 'We hereby confirm that we will be responding to Mr Brink's request by 20 October 2010', after she'd pressed him on the telephone on the 1st and again by email on the 4th asking 'LASA to respond to the request to avoid unnecessary, expensive and protracted litigation' – which proves Hundermark was centrally involved in handling my August 2010 PAIA request after I called the SAHRC in, following your deemed refusal under section 27 by illegally failing to respond to it – and then:

    - the attempted fraud on me in the ghost-written letter you signed on 18 October 2010 now expressly refusing my entire request for 51 specified records (which

was plainly directed at exposing as a lie Nair's claim to me on 3 August 2010 that a decision had been taken not to fill the Senior Litigator posts) by misquoting a reported judgment to justify the blanket refusal of my entire request, by putting words in the judge's mouth that she never spoke, whereas her actual reported dicta, consistent with the Act, squarely supported my request. I annex the first relevant pages of my petition to LASA chairperson Mlambo JP and the Board about this on 30 November 2010 detailing this revolting chicanery.

19. Although Nair's distinctive stylistic fingerprint sentence-opener, 'Noting that ...', appears repeatedly in your October 2010 letter – he used it repeatedly in his evidence and admitted using it repeatedly at an international legal aid conference in the Netherlands a couple of weeks before the trial – Nair denied in court having written it.

20. Besides Hundermark, Mtati was also involved in the illegal refusal of my first PAIA request, because the record shows he was collecting the documents I'd asked for (they were emailed to him), before they were all illegally refused on the said crooked basis.

21. So was it Hundermark or Mtati or Nair who ghost-wrote your letter advancing the lying budgetary pretext for aborting my appointment and illegally refusing my entire first PAIA request under cover of a fraudulent misquotation from a reported judgment? (If indeed it was Nair, as appears from his stylistic fingerprints all over the letter, he's obviously going to prison for falsely denying it under oath.) If Hundermark or Mtati, they've got big trouble coming too. Please advise.

22. In a letter you forged on your own computer (author 'VidhuV') while Board chairperson Mlambo JP was abroad in the US, copying and pasting an image of his signature below it (one can see the scanning shadow around it) to make it appear to me he'd signed it (this is actually admitted in LASA's pleadings), my extraordinarily serious 59-page petition protesting your illegal refusal to comply with PAIA under cover of a fraudulent misquotation from a reported judgment, uttered in a separate indented, italicised, block quotation to sugar the lie, and the already clear indications that my appointment had been aborted illegally under cover of a lying budgetary justification, was brushed off in two sentences typed on your own computer while he was across the Atlantic:

> I have reviewed the actions of Legal Aid South Africa regarding your candidature for the Senior Litigator position in KwaZulu-Natal. I could find no unfairness or arbitrariness towards you as you allege or at all.

Which verdict concerning my complaint against you, on two serious counts, you then emailed him to email me, two weeks later. Like when a judge allows the accused to write his judgment for him, pretending to have given the case his careful attention, and then acquitting him without reasons given, which the accused in the dock hands up to the judge on the bench to deliver to the complainant in the gallery. What a wonderful world.

23. I didn't ask for it, but the Board Secretary has just given me your 'Confidential' report to the Board on 'Labour Matters Referred to Courts and CCMA' on 31 October 2014 (author 'VidhuV'), and the minute of the Board meeting in November noting it. (In my experience, LASA documents telling lies are invariably marked 'Confidential'; this is now the fourth time I've seen this.)

24. Your report (author 'VidhuV') shows that you've now personally told the Board the lie that the 'Senior Litigator position [at the] Pietermaritzburg JC ... was frozen owing to a management decision in relation to cost-cutting measures', well knowing that:

    (i) no record of any such decision exists whatsoever; and,

    (ii) had such decision been taken, the Approval Framework required that the Board approve this deviation from the Business/Performance Plan, based on its Strategic Plan to employ Senior Litigators.

25. A quick look at the chronology exposes your lie to the Board last year.

26. On 16 July 2010, you, Nair and Makokoane proposed in your 'Report to Board' that some vacant public defender posts serving the lower criminal courts be temporarily frozen to save costs until resolution of the uncertainty about when the Department would be providing funds for OSD phase 1 salary increases in 2010/11. In the report you all assured the Board that recruitment to critical posts (like Senior Litigator posts at the very top of LASA's professional ranks) would be prioritised. A fortnight later on 29 July you emailed Nair to discuss my letter just received, in which I was pressing you to see to the finalisation my appointment, now eight months since my successful interview. The following day on 30 July you and Nair attended the Board Executive meeting but said nothing about also freezing Senior Litigator posts to save costs. On 31 July you were present waiting outside as the Board meeting took place, at which the Board approved your, Nair's and Makokoane's proposal to temporarily freeze some lower criminal court posts only. Again there was no talk by you of freezing top-rank critical Senior Litigator posts as a way of making more cost-savings – temporarily, let alone permanently. Then 'in July 2010 after the Board meeting' (per LASA's pleadings) – which means on 31 July after the Board meeting had

finished and the Board members had left for their homes, hotels, restaurants and airports, you and Nair took 'the decision to abort the recruitment' (LASA pleaded) of Senior Litigators for the Pietermaritzburg, Durban, and Mthatha posts – according to your October 2010 letter to me, reiterated in your January 2011 letter, and verified on affidavit in April 2011. Only, as Nair repeatedly admitted on oath in April 2011 and at trial in mid-2013, no record whatsoever exists of this alleged decision. And the Board wasn't even told about it (LASA pleaded), let alone was its approval obtained, as the Approval Framework required.

27. Which story Nair also verified in his affidavit in April 2011, only to change the story completely several months later in his 'Report to Board' of November 2011 (after I'd blown it to pieces in my very detailed original statement of claim in July), telling the Board two entirely different lies about why my appointment was aborted (mentioned above).

28. And then in court in mid-2013, he persisted with the lie you told me in October 2010 that the Pietermaritzburg and Durban recruitments were cancelled 'In July 2010' for budgetary reasons, but, contradicting your lie, not the Mthatha one, which he said you aborted for entirely unrelated reasons, against his repeatedly expressed wishes (mentioned below).

29. Makokoane's money claim is for his 'team to read the bundle as referred in your footnotes to advise me with the gist of the background explanation.' This less extensive reading, which didn't include my pending applications to compel your compliance with PAIA, but included time spent advising him of 'the gist of the background explanation', allegedly took his 'team' a much longer 'almost 220 hours'.

30. Do you think the reason for this is that Makokoane's 'team' can't read as quickly as Hundermark's 'team'? Or could it be because, after reading 'the bundle as referred in your footnotes' (there were several bundles in my labour case) but not the application papers, his 'team' then took four days without a break (33 hours, 8 hours in a working day) to convey to him the 'gist of the background explanation'.

31. Or do you think like Hundermark, Makokoane is also telling me lies in his scheming to obstruct my exercise of my fundamental right to information, and blocking my access to incriminating documents with a view to protecting Nair and other top officers from being brought to book?

32. Do you have any idea why Makokoane needed a different 'team' from Hundermark's to read the papers in my labour case before he could respond to my PAIA request?

Or is it the same team, as would appear from the similar language used in their letters, dishonestly double-charging me like crooked lawyers?

33. Did they possibly think I wouldn't notice, and the High Court wouldn't notice, the substantially identical headings of their letters (Nair's too) containing the same superfluous wrong words 'or information' after the correct words 'request for records' (contrary to its name, PAIA doesn't permit requests for information per se, only for records); and the selfsame opening phrase too, 'I have had an opportunity of perusing' etc, giving the game away, like bumbling criminals leaving their ID books on the floor at the bank for the police to find afterwards?

34. And can you explain why, unlike Hundermark's 'team', Makokoane's 'team' didn't find it necessary to read the application papers compelling you and your regional deputy information officers to comply with my November 2013 PAIA requests, which you illegally refused, in order to provide him with the 'gist of the background explanation' giving rise to my PAIA request addressed to him?

35. Whatever the answers to these very perplexing questions, Hundermark's and Makokoane's demands are illegal. The Act doesn't permit reading fees of any kind by information officers, by deputy information officers, or by their 'teams'. Including a fee for time spent reading a PAIA request.

36. Nor does the Act permit a record requester to be charged a fee for time spent by some person in a deputy information officer's 'team' briefing him on the context in which records have been requested, which is to say the requester's apparent purpose in making his request.

37. More especially because section 11(3) holds a record requester's purpose, whether stated or surmised, in seeking access to the record of a public body to be immaterial. Such as collecting evidence for a perjury prosecution on a score of different counts, a sacking, a professional strike-off, and an application for leave to appeal with further cold print evidence of perjury on multiple scores.

38. The 'background explanation' allegedly summarised for Makokoane is consequently irrelevant.

39. In truth and in fact, however, Makokoane well knew the 'background explanation' of my request already, because back in September 2010 I'd appealed to him to intervene in the irregular abortion of my appointment to the top professional post for which I'd been recommended (he was then Nair's superior according to LASA's

organogram at the time, later changed to elevate Nair to equivalent rank), and I copied Hundermark in, so he knew the 'background explanation' too:

- Both Makokoane and Hundermark already knew full well that the story Nair had told me on 3 August 2010 to cover the true reason for the abortion of my appointment, namely that it had been decided not to fill LASA's Senior Litigator posts, was a lie.

  No such decision had duly been taken, and accordingly no record of it exists, as Nair repeatedly confirmed on oath on affidavit in April 2011 and again in court in July/August 2013.

- Makokoane knew better than anyone that had such a major decision been taken at national executive management level not to fill these critical budgeted and funded posts, Board approval of the decision would have been necessary, because the Approval Framework requires Board approval for any deviation from the Business/Performance Plan based on the Board's Strategic Plan 2009–12, drawn in accordance with the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act and the Treasury Regulations and duly presented to the Minister and to Parliament – which Strategic Plan included employing Senior Litigators, as you repeatedly mentioned in your CEO report on the completion of the Strategic Plan for that period, and which information LASA's annual report repeated a third time.

  Makokoane knew this very well, because he himself had applied to the Board on 16 July 2010 for such similar approval when proposing on the management executive committee's behalf, at Nair's suggestion the previous day (to spur payment, Nair testified), to temporarily freeze recruitment to some non-critical public defender posts serving the lower criminal courts – and none other – until the uncertainty in 2010 about when LASA's OSD phase 1 funding would be paid had been resolved. All fully documented.

- Both Makokoane and Hundermark knew full well that the story fed me in your first letter of 18 October 2010, even as you were illegally refusing my entire PAIA request in August under cover of a fraudulent misquotation from a reported judgment, namely that budgetary insufficiency prevented LASA filling its remaining vacant Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Mthatha Senior Litigator posts, was another lie, amplifying, with a financial justification, Nair's lie to me on 3 August 2010 that it had been decided not to fill the posts.

They knew this because in truth and in fact your Senior Litigator posts at the top of LASA's professional staff establishment were not affected by the Board's decision on 30 July 2010 to temporarily freeze recruitment to a limited number of vacant public defender posts serving the lower criminal courts at the bottom of LASA's professional ranks. (The approved brake was lifted on such recruitment just two months later, and all the posts were filled '100%', you later reported). To the contrary, as said, Makokoane assured the Board in his Report to Board that recruitment to such critical posts would be prioritised. (Although her foolishly denied it, and testified that LASA's most junior posts were critical, not its most senior ones, it was common cause on the pleadings that Senior Litigator posts are 'critical' (LASA's word).

40. Incidentally, did you know that testifying under oath in court, Nair practically called you a liar on two counts, trying to pass the buck to you (i) for his egregious misconduct in unlawfully obstructing the implementation of the Board's Strategic Plan regarding the employment of Senior Litigators for grossly improper reasons, and then (ii) for the cover-up going as far as lying to the Minister and to Parliament via secret reports he ghost-wrote for you to give Mlambo JP to sign and submit to these authorities (which you did, knowing they were full of lies) to pervert their independent enquiries into my complaints that you'd repeatedly illegally refused to comply with my first two PAIA requests in 2010 and that my appointment had been irregularly aborted?

    - Radically contradicting the story you told me in your October 2010 letter, repeated in your January 2011 letter, and swore to under penalty of perjury in your PAIA affidavit in April 2011, which story, after I sued for instatement to the post I was recommended for, was consistently repeated in LASA's pleadings and interlocutory affidavits (but not in Nair's completely different November 2011 Report to Board), namely that due to budgetary insufficiency, LASA had decided not to fill its three vacant Senior Litigator posts at Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Mthatha, Nair alleged quite differently in court, and admitted that the cancellation of the Mthatha recruitment had nothing to do with any budgetary consideration.

      He then blamed you for it, claiming that after he and the Legal Services Technical Committee (including Makokoane and Hundermark), of which he's chairperson, had unanimously resolved to recruit a Senior Litigator for the Mthatha post as an immediate priority, being sorely needed there according to then Eastern Cape Regional Operations Executive Thembile Mtati's pressing motivation for the

transfer of the redundant, long-vacant Kimberley Senior Litigator post, you – very unreasonably, and to the detriment of service delivery by LASA – refused to approve the LSTC's unanimous decision (as required of you by the Approval Framework), despite his repeated attempts to persuade you to agree.

- Nair also blamed you, and then Mlambo JP, and then you again, for telling the several fresh lies that he (Nair) added to the 'updated' report to Parliament in June 2011 which he'd ghost-written for Mlambo JP to sign and give the Minister in March to pervert his enquiry into my complaints.

41. And did you know that at trial Nair blamed you for the abortion of my recruitment, alleging that it was your idea, and that you had suggested that the Pietermaritzburg Senior Litigator post for which I'd been selected be frozen (off the record, and without Board approval as required by the Approval Framework)?

42. That is, in his cowardly, pathologically dishonest manoeuvring to evade culpability for his capital misconduct, Nair gave evidence on oath behind your back to frame you for it as principal perpetrator, rather than as his accomplice in the cover-up.

43. Now that you're aware that Nair told the judge these lies about you, all of which, among so many others, he swore, with his hand in the air were the perfect truth, please advise me what you intend doing as CEO about his repeated perjury in implicating you in and blaming you for his own misconduct. You can be sure that at the enquiry to follow you'll be questioned about your reaction to this news of Nair's lies about you told under oath in court.

44. In November 2012, directly on account of my repeated complaints to the SAHRC about your and Nair's persistent illegal refusal of my PAIA requests in 2010/11 and false section 32 reporting about it afterwards to conceal from the SAHRC and from the National Assembly in turn your illegal suppression of documentary evidence (to obstruct and defeat the ends of justice), the SAHRC found it necessary to deliver your national office lawyers a special remedial lesson on how PAIA works.

45. Lying under oath, as usual, Nair told the judge he knew nothing of this workshop. Email records I obtained from you after trial (the very few you duly surrendered, the majority refused) prove categorically that Nair knew all about it.

46. Nair also denied any knowledge of the SAHRC's PAIA audit of LASA; again, the email records prove he contemptuously lied to the judge about this too.

47. As CEO, what are you going to do about this further interminable, compulsive perjury of his? As said, you will certainly be asked this again at the enquiry to follow this case.

48. The SAHRC's report of the PAIA training workshop records your national office attorneys' admission that on account of their 'lack of application based knowledge' causing them 'challenges complying with PAIA' they felt 'overwhelmed by the requirements of the legislation', and that 'LASA compliance history was flagged with participants and most responded to the reporting of LASA as non-compliant to Parliament with concern'.

49. The SAHRC was referring to the 'reporting of the Brink saga (you may be familiar with it – Patrick [Hundermark] is) to Parliament', as its PAIA Unit director mentioned in her email to the Open Democracy Advice Centre on 12 July 2011, copying Hundermark in.

50. Indeed, in its Annual Report for 2011/12, the SAHRC reported LASA to the National Assembly as a PAIA defaulter in its section 84 report. Concerning the failure of public institutions to comply with their PAIA compliance reporting obligations, the SAHRC cited:

> A case in point … where a complainant brought to the attention of the Commission a number of requests made to LASA which were not reported in LASA's 2010/11 section 32 report despite the fact that the requests were made in that financial year.

51. Strangely the SAHRC neglected to report to the National Assembly LASA's substantial repeated illegal refusal to comply with my first three PAIA requests, even as it had noted the 'unlawfulness' of this in its correspondence with me. (Nearly all records illegally refused were later released, but only under persistent pressure, in the labour litigation.)

52. The SAHRC's training workshop report further records that 'LASA has identified the need to have a clear budget dedicated to PAIA compliance and implementation', and that it had undertaken 'to create guidelines within the organisation to ensure misapplication does not recur' in the handling of PAIA requests like mine, particularly since 'misinterpretation and misapplication was identified as being high risk to LASA', having regard to 'the status of PAIA as a fundamental right' (sic), a matter 'reiterated and emphasized at different points of the training'.

53. Likewise underscored was ‘the need to break the culture of secrecy which shrouds the public service in general’ and LASA in particular – maintained by its highest officers in their illegal collusion to cover up the most extraordinarily serious misconduct.

54. And then on 25 October 2011, right after LASA’s attorneys had very frankly conceded to the SAHRC that it hadn’t complied with PAIA in the handling of my record requests (besides me, no other records requesters were obstructed), LASA (Nair instructing, Mtati signing) blithely lied to court in its pleadings in my labour case:

> The Respondent contends that the Applicant’s requests in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (“PAIA”) were answered completely and lawfully and those documents that were refused were refused in terms of the law.

55. Which brazen lie Mtati repeated on oath in his prodigiously perjurious interlocutory affidavit on 16 January 2013 supported by a confirmatory affidavit by Nair.

56. And which lie Mtati repeated again in his even more massively perjurious affidavit of 22 January 2015 opposing my petition for leave to appeal, telling fresh new lies contradicting the old ones told in court; in which affidavit, filed out of time, he sought condonation for LASA’s non-compliance with the rules of the Labour Appeal Court with yet more bare-faced perjury, lying to the Judge President that he hadn’t known I’d filed my signed and attested petition before he went off on holiday on 12 December 2014 – his excuse given on oath for his inaction flatly refuted and exposed as a lie by the record of an email I sent him on the 8th, which he admits he read on the same day, before pushing off without attending to my petition.

57. It’s evident from the illegal responses to my current four PAIA requests in November 2014, and from the illegal responses to my three requests in November 2013 now before the Magistrate’s Court, that your ‘team’ of national office ‘legal representatives’ were unable to learn anything from the SAHRC’s training workshop. (The attendance register shows that Hundermark, Makokoane, Nair and Corporate Service Executive Thembile Mtati didn’t think they needed to go.) The special lesson on how to apply PAIA to give effect to the fundamental right to information, and consequently the importance of complying with it, just didn’t sink in.

58. Here’s a refresher course then on how PAIA works for the slow learners in LASA’s national office.

59. After a record requester has lodged his request in the form prescribed by section 18 and paid his request fee prescribed by section 22(1), as I did, section 25(1) requires that the

> information officer to whom the request is made ... must, as soon as reasonably possible, but in any event, within 30 days, after the request is received –
>
> (a) decide in accordance with this Act whether to grant the request; and
>
> (b) notify the requester of the decision ...

60. Section 26 allows the timeframe to be extended by a maximum of another 30 days – i.e. calendar days, not court or business days, according to section 4 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 on the 'Reckoning of number of days' prescribed by a statute.

61. Section 25(2)(a) provides that:

> If the request for access is granted, the notice in terms of subsection 1 (b) must state –
>
> (a) the access fee (if any) to be paid upon access.

62. Section 1, 'Definitions' tells us that:

> "access fee" means a fee prescribed for the purpose of section 22(6).

63. Which provides:

> (6) A requester whose request for access has been granted must pay an access fee for reproduction and for search and preparation contemplated in subsection (7)(a) and (b), respectively, for any time reasonably required in excess of the prescribed hours to search for and prepare ... the record for disclosure.

64. Subsection 7(a) and (b) allows:

> a reasonable access fee for –
>
> (a) the cost of making a copy ... and ... the postal fee; and
>
> (b) the time reasonably required to search for the record and prepare ... the record for disclosure to the requester.'

65. The Act therefore required Hundermark and Makokoane to decide, within the prescribed time allowed, which of my record requests they were granting and which they were refusing (with reasons, referenced to Chapter 4, 'GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL OF ACCESS TO RECORDS'), and to notify me of (i) their decisions regarding each record allowed or refused, and (ii) their reasonable access fees for searching and copying those allowed.

66. Hundermark and Makokoane have failed to comply with their obligations under the Act.

67. Nair has unlawfully expressly refused, also out of time, my entire request addressed to him, citing various obviously irrelevant and inapplicable sections of PAIA – including section 7, which isn't even included in Chapter 4.

68. To read Nair telling me that his 'response is given to you on the basis of the advice of my legal representatives, which I verily accept' is to recall:

    (i) LASA's head office attorneys' concession to the SAHRC that when it comes to PAIA they don't know what's going on; and,

    (ii) Nair's evidence in court that his legal studies through the mail hadn't included a course on PAIA.

69. Apparently the same 'team' of 'legal representatives' advising Hundermark and Makokoane to obstruct my requests gave Nair the 'advice' to refuse my entire request addressed to him. (Centrally involved in my labour case, Nair couldn't sensibly claim to have needed to read all the bundles to be placed to respond.) Their letters have substantially the same headings, as mentioned above, and display the same pitiful legal ignorance.

70. And like Nair's letter, Hundermark's and Makokoane's letters contain the same meretricious statement that I consented to an extension within which to respond. Sure I did; I'm an obliging sort of guy. I knew they all wanted to go away on for their Christmas holiday, and I'm playing a long and patient game to collar the rogues. None of the letters mention that the extensions had expired, and that all three deputy information officers were unlawfully outside the extended time limit for responding when their 'team' of 'legal representatives' wrote to me. Like when a used car salesman declaims brightly that the lemon he's trying to flog has just been serviced. Without mentioning the crack in the block.

71. It's apparent from a glance at my request addressed to Nair that it's directed at categorically exposing some of his more obviously foolish perjury in court. My request practically asks Nair to supply the rope for his own hanging. Naturally he's unwilling, for as Board director Ela Gandhi explained very perspicaciously in the *Mercury* on 23 November 2011:

> It's only when people have things they are not proud of that they want to hide things.

72. Section 17(2) gives you 'direction and control over every deputy information officer' you've delegated.

73. Section 17(6)(b) provides that your delegation of your responsibility as information officer to them:

> does not prohibit the person who made the delegation from exercising the power concerned or performing the duty concerned himself or herself.

74. That is, notwithstanding your delegations to these other persons, you remain the person primarily accountable as information officer for LASA's compliance with the Act.

75. I accordingly call on you either to direct your delinquent deputy information officers to belatedly comply with my record requests or take my requests over from them and do so yourself.

76. If you do not do either of these things, I'll conclude, and later argue, that you evidently support their violation of my fundamental right of information by illegally frustrating and refusing my PAIA requests with the object of suppressing documentary evidence of egregious malfeasance, corruption and criminality in LASA's top ranks – including lying to Parliament, to the Minister, to the LASA Board, and internally contradictory and objectively contradicted perjury, going off chaotically in all different directions like cheap fireworks, before, during, and continuing even after the trial of my labour claim.

77. This demand is not any sort of appeal to you under the Act, because contrary to the false information contained in the latest revision of your PAIA manual, to be quoted presently, you have no appeal authority in the matter of PAIA requests.

78. This is because LASA is a section 1(b)(ii) 'institution' among the sorts of 'public body' contemplated by section 1 of the Act under the heading 'Definitions'.

79. A ‘public body’ is variously defined by section 1 as (I’ve italicised the pertinent bits for emphasis):

> (a) any department of state or administration in the national or provincial sphere of government or any municipality in the local sphere of government; or
>
> (b) *any other* functionary or *institution when* –
>
> (i) exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or
>
> (ii) exercising a public power or *performing a public function in terms of any legislation.*

80. Such as the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014, from the 1st of this month. Or the Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969 before that.

81. And section 78(2)(c) of PAIA provides (I’ve redacted it for relevance):

> A requester - …
>
> (c) aggrieved by the decision of the information officer of a public body referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘public body’ in section 1 –
>
> (i) to refuse a request for access …
>
> may, by way of an application, within 180 days apply to court for appropriate relief in terms of section 82.

82. In short, no internal appeal lies against the refusal of a request for access to the records of a public body such as LASA, and my remedy for non-compliance stipulated by the Act is to apply directly to court.

83. The SAHRC’s PAIA Unit alerted me to this right at the beginning of my troubles with LASA over PAIA, and will confirm it to you.

84. So the requirement of section 20 of LASA’s PAIA manual revised in 2010* and approved by the Board –

> 20. Remedies available for noncompliance with the Act
> In case of non compliance with any request by the Deputy Information Officer, the Designated Deputy Information Officer or any other personnel authorised by

the Information Officer, the requester shall appeal to the Information Officer who shall consider such appeal within 15 days and after which the requester may resolve the dispute by approaching the relevant court directly.

– is inconsistent with the Act and seriously misleads the public.

85. (*The 2013 revision of the PAIA manual hasn't yet been published online for easy public access, but I've seen this section quoted by LASA as section 18, apparently renumbered but otherwise unchanged. Apart from the legal nonsense the section contains about appealing to you against 'non compliance with any request' , its impressive-sounding but spurious distinctions between 'Deputy Information Officer, the Designated Deputy Information Officer or any other personnel authorised by the Information Officer' are more legal nonsense unsupported by section 17 of the Act.)

86. Given your repeated persistent past illegal refusals of my PAIA requests in October 2010, January 2011, and November 2013, and your pointless, dilatory opposition on your very junior counsel's clueless advice of my pending application to compel your compliance with the last-mentioned request, I've no reason to expect you'll now begin complying with your constitutional and statutory obligations as LASA's information officer and see to it that my PAIA requests are duly complied with.

87. It also seems unlikely that your very most senior attorney Patrick Hundermark and your very most senior advocate Brian Nair in your national management executive committee will reverse themselves and concede that as deputy information officers of a major public entity, when it comes to responding to PAIA requests they've no idea what they're doing.

88. Or maybe they do, and what they're doing is outrageously abusing their offices as deputy information officers to suppress documentary evidence of exceedingly grave wrongdoing at the top of LASA's directorate and executive, including, in Nair's case, his own.

89. I've asked the SAHRC to intervene, but in view of LASA national executive management's evident united determination to obstruct and defeat the ends of justice by suppressing documentary evidence of Nair's many perjuries at the trial of my claim to my appointment, I'm not optimistic. My past interactions with the SAHRC as our constitutionally appointed fundamental rights watchdog have been bitterly disappointing, time and again.

90. I'm consequently preparing an application to the High Court at Pietermaritzburg under section 78 for an order compelling compliance with my four requests in

November 2014, and I intend citing you as first respondent in your capacity as LASA's information officer ultimately responsible and accountable for PAIA compliance at LASA.

91. But if after consulting the SAHRC you decide it would be better for LASA as a public entity to start complying with the Act, and stop illegally contravening it, and to start respecting my fundamental right to information, and stop illegally violating it, I'll call off my intended application. The same goes for my pending applications in the Magistrate's Court.

92. Please let me know your intentions within ten working days of receiving this letter. This will give you time to consult the SAHRC for its guidance and training on PAIA delivered under section 83(3)(d) and (e). Believe me madam you need it.

93. If I need to sue, as I anticipate from dismal past experience I inevitably will, I'll include this letter in my papers for the High Court's information about the attempt I made to avert the unnecessary, avoidable litigation to vindicate my fundamental right to information.

94. Finally, I enclose another PAIA request addressed to you for your attention, inter alia testing Hundermark's and Makokoane's money claims against me, and seeking sight of LASA's insurance policy with Camargue, referred to in your report to the Board on 31 October 2014 about my case, and all requests for and reports to this insurer to assist it in 'managing the matter'.

95. If my request for access is granted, I'll naturally be cross-checking with your insurer to verify the completeness of the records provided me. I anticipate that the content of the reports will support a criminal charge and a civil action for insurance fraud, and I intend claiming the R5000 reward they tout for reporting it. I need a new wristwatch.

96. I remind you that section 25(1), quoted above, requires that you:

> must, as soon as reasonably possible, but in any event within 30 days, after the request is received –
>
> (a) decide in accordance with this Act whether to grant the request; and
>
> (b) notify the requester of the decision ...

97. My request is simple, so to conform yourself with your obligation to decide and notify me ‘as soon as reasonably possible’, your decision whether to grant it or not ‘must’ be immediate. The records can follow later.

98. If you decide to grant my request there’ll be no access fee for searching, because the extant records are electronically stored and easily located, nor for copying, because I’ve asked that they be emailed to me, not sent by post. I’ve paid the prescribed request fee by EFT reference: PAIA/VV.

99. If you refuse my request or any part of it, I’ll sue you immediately for the records I want, or your sworn certification that they don’t exist.

100. Let me conclude by giving you my sincere assurance that there will be no end to this matter until I have justice (the multiple gross basic irregularities in the premature, hasty dismissal of my petition to the Judge President of the Labour Appeal Court beggar belief), and until all those who’ve gravely misconducted themselves and lied to me, to the Board, to the SAHRC, to the Minister, to Parliament, and to court in the cover-up are held to account.

ANTHONY BRINK

Cc: Adv Lawrence Mushwana: Chairperson, South African Human Rights Commission

Langa Lethiba: LASA Board Secretary, for the information of the Board

25 Baker Road
Prestbury
Pietermaritzburg 3201
30 November 2010

The Honourable Mr Justice Dunstan Mlambo
Judge President: Labour Court
Chairperson: Legal Aid South Africa

Labour Court
6th and 7th Floors, Arbour Square Building
Cnr. Juta & Melle Streets
Braamfontein
Johannesburg

And to:

The Board of Directors: Legal Aid South Africa

Mr M Makume, Mr J Maree, Ms N Mgadza, Prof P Kruger, Mr V Jarana, Prof Y Vawda, Adv P du Rand, Ms E Gandhi, Mr M Moabi, Ms M Naidoo, Judge E Molahlehi, Ms S Monaledi, Ms A Mosidi, Ms N Memka, Ms A Rhoda, Dr D Konar, Ms T Mhlungu, Ms J Luthuli, Mr E Moolla, and Mr I Ramdas

Legal Aid South Africa
29 De Beer Street
Braamfontein
Johannesburg

And to:

Ms Chantal Kisoon
Head: PAIA Unit
South African Human Rights Commission
29 Princess of Wales Terrace
Houghton
Johannesburg

Dear Judge Mlambo

Pietermaritzburg Senior Litigator post:

• Illegal political / racial discrimination – covered with false reasons advanced to justify it, and two African candidates selected and recommended for similar posts sacrificed to effect it; • failure by members of the Management Executive Committee to execute a key component of Legal Aid South Africa's Strategic Plan, concealed from the Board of Directors and from the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Justice and Constitutional Development; • multiple contraventions of the Public Finance Management Act, including the presentation of false financial information in Legal Aid South Africa's 2009/10 Annual Report; • and refusal to comply with a request for records in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act on bogus legal and factual grounds

1. When a year ago I told my partner, my sons, my brothers, and a couple of my closest friends that my interview for the Pietermaritzburg Senior Litigator post had gone extremely well and that I was certain I'd been selected for it (confirmed to me last month), I was met with unwelcome scepticism: 'They'll never appoint you, you're too politically controversial.' 'They're going through the motions formally, but behind the scenes they'll just do whatever they want.' One even suggested that ultimately I'd be disqualified for being white.
2. These disagreeably pessimistic predictions sprung from the fact that to many people whose opinions are informed by the newspapers I'm indeed a 'politically sensitive person', to cite the lingo of PW Botha's State Security Council and its operatives, with the extreme prejudice such an appellation attracted. And indeed I'm indubitably a white person too.
3. I remember rebuking their cynicism vehemently: 'No, you don't understand. The process is transparent, it's clean. Things have changed. We're not living

under apartheid anymore, we have a constitutional democracy now.' Words and sentiments along those lines.

4. By 'clean' I meant the recruitment process was being managed by honourable and honest executives of impeccable and unquestionable integrity who would never do anything illegal and who would never think of telling lies.
5. I really believed it and I insisted, even as the months passed by, but I could not convince them.
6. As things turned out, I was to be sorely disappointed in my absolute confidence and conviction that the recruitment process was being managed by honourable and honest executives of impeccable and unquestionable integrity who would never do anything illegal and who would never think of telling lies.
7. I found that in fact the recruitment process was not transparent and clean; that the executives managing it were not honourable and honest; and that they didn't stint at acting illegally and telling lies to cover up the illegal things they'd done.
8. The 'Introduction' to 'Corporate Governance Arrangements' in Section 4 of LASA's Annual Report 2009/10 states that 'processes and practices are reviewed on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the legal obligation to use funds in an economic, efficient and effective manner and to adhere to good corporate governance practices'.
9. It assures us: 'Processes are underpinned by the principles of openness, integrity and accountability.'
10. And it explains: 'Corporate governance is concerned with structures and processes for decision making, accountability, control and behaviour. It starts at the Board of the organisation and this sets the tone for behaviour down to operational level at Justice Centres.'
11. Finally the 'Business Conduct' subsection records that 'Legal Aid South Africa has an ethics programme which promotes ethical behaviour in the workplace. This is supported by a written business conduct policy dealing with ethics,

which is applicable throughout Legal Aid South Africa. The continued focus on the business conduct policy has raised awareness of the need for ethical behaviour across the organisation. Employees are required to maintain high ethical standards and to ensure that Legal Aid South Africa's business practices are conducted in a manner that is above reproach.'

12. And it's relevant to mention that section 50(1) (b) of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 ('PFMA') stipulates that 'The accounting authority for a public entity must act with fidelity, honesty and integrity and in the best interests of the public entity in managing the financial affairs of the public entity.'
13. Having regard to the Board of Directors' oversight responsibility to ensure that 'good corporate governance practices' based on 'principles of openness, integrity and accountability' are observed by the Management Executive Committee in 'decision making, accountability, control and behaviour', and the Board's concern about 'ethical behaviour in the workplace', that 'high ethical standards' be observed, and that 'business practices' should be 'above reproach' – which is why their 'processes and practices are reviewed on an ongoing basis' – I write to report gross, in fact illegal, breaches in this regard by certain individuals on the Management Executive Committee.
14. The basic history is set out in my letters to CEO Vidhu Vedalankar and to COO Jerry Makokoane at pages 1–17 and 21–39 of the Document Bundle appended hereto, read with NOE Brian Nair's and CEO Vedalankar's responses at pages 19 and 101–108. (I will henceforth refer to all LASA officers simply by their surnames.)
15. One might even conclude from the 'behaviour' described in these letters, compounded by the dishonest cover-up that followed it (to be detailed and exposed below) that far from respecting 'the rights enshrined in our constitution' (per LASA's 'Vision') and 'principles of openness, integrity and accountability' in 'decision making' (per LASA Annual Report 2010), the

executives in question have no respect for these rights and principles and that they actually despise them.

16. In my letters to Vedalankar and Makokoane mentioned above, I'd assumed political prejudice against me – something I'm accustomed to. (Bundle, page 11, paragraphs 5.1–14 and pages 93–99 (a letter to Adv Paul Hoffman SC, director of the Institute for Accountability in Southern Africa, including information intended for the unwritten 'Postscript' mentioned in paragraph 58 of my letter to Makokoane)). I've recently appreciated, however, though I doubt it, that the prejudice may simply be racial, albeit no less illegal, inasmuch as my selection and recommendation for the appointment in question might have been inconvenient for the targets set out in LASA's 'Employment Equity Plan for 2010-2015'.
17. Arising from the 'behaviour' in question, I filed an extensive request for records under the Promotion of Access to Information Act ('PAIA') with Vedalankar as LASA's information officer ex officio on 30 August. (Bundle, pages 49–69)
18. On 29 September, the day before the end of the month provided by the Act for compliance with my request, and not having received any response to it, not even an acknowledgement of receipt, I approached the South African Human Rights Commission ('SAHRC') with a plea for assistance.
19. Kindly taking the matter up for me, the director of the SAHRC's PAIA Unit Chantal Kisoon ably negotiated an undertaking from LDE Patrick Hundermark to deal with my records request. Although Vedalankar was out of time for compliance (there was a mix-up over the computation of the period prescribed), I didn't mind, I was just glad that my request would be given attention at last.
20. On 18 October I received a letter from Vedalankar rejecting my request. (Bundle, pages101–108)

21. Although the letter bears Vedalankar's electronic signature (a scanned image of it is pasted above her name at the end, identical to the image at the end of her CEO report in the 2009/10 Annual Report) it's unimaginable to me that she actually wrote it, and indeed it seems doubtful that she even read it with any attention. I say this having regard to the letter's contents, which are irreconcilable with my understanding of her personal integrity, noted in my letter to her of 12 July. (Bundle, page 10, paragraph 1.1) The letter is replete with false statements, deceptive red herrings, deceptive non-disclosures, and a breathtakingly brazen false statement of the law in regard to the application of PAIA, advanced as a justification for not complying with her obligations under the Act and for refusing my request for records.
22. Vedalankar seems to have authorized the letter drawn in her name trusting that it was in order. I therefore hold her clear of culpability for its disgraceful contents and hope you will too. Although I accept that Vedalankar never actually wrote the letter, for reference sake I must continue referring to it and its contents as if she did. I apologise to her in advance for the hard criticism to follow: it's directed at the real author of the letter, and not at her as the nominal author only.
23. The letter begins with a fraud. Numbered paragraph 1 claims:

> The test to be applied to a request for information in terms of the PAIA, as laid down by the court in the case of *National Teachers Union v Superintendent General: Department of Education & Culture, Kwazulu-Natal and Another (D38/08) [2008] ZALC 18, is as follows:*
>
> a) *In dealing with a request in terms of the Act, the question is not whether the requester is entitled to information but about whether the information is relevant for the purpose of enabling the requester to exercise a right that maybe breached, rendered unenforceable or weakened by the non disclosure.*

24. (There is no paragraph 'b)' and the phrase 'is as follows' is italicized in the original as above.)
25. The use of indented block paragraphs is a universal writing convention to distinguish quoted text from the writer's own prose. One understands, therefore, that the indented block quote is an excerpt from the judgment. This impression is further emphasized by the use of distinguishing italics in the indented paragraph. Indeed, the indented, italicized block paragraph is preceded by the explicit claim that the 'test to be applied … as laid down by the court … is as follows:'.
26. To read the National Teachers Union case is to discover that in truth no such 'test to be applied' was 'laid down by the court'. The judge said nothing of the sort. He said precisely the opposite. The alleged 'test to be applied' is pure invention, with the lie compounded by dressing it in fake legal authority, even putting words in the judge's mouth that he never spoke. From the CEO of Legal Aid South Africa. Magnificent!
27. In paragraph 32 of his judgment Pillay J pertinently noted to the contrary: 'Unlike access to information from another person, access to information from the state is manifestly not constrained by the requirement that information should be for the exercise or protection of any rights.' (The judgment is online at http://j.mp/dxh3sZ. (All shortened internet URLs in this letter will henceforth be given simply as 'j.mp [.....]'))
28. Having sucked this so-called 'test to be applied' out of her thumb, pretending that a 'court … laid [it] down', Vedalankar proceeds to apply her false test to my records request. Paragraph 2 commences: 'In considering your request for information we were guided by this principle, together with Section 32 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the PAIA.'
29. Decorating her decision in bits of the Constitution and PAIA quoted at me at some length, in a manner possibly quite impressive-looking to legally unschooled persons, Vedalankar concludes by refusing my records request on

wholly unrelated grounds, namely '(i) your request for information [sic: for records] goes beyond your individual circumstances and extends to information on third parties, (ii) the information on third parties does not fall within the section 46 category above'. (Bundle, page 102, paragraph 5)

30. Of course, this reason given has nothing to do with the fake 'test' or 'principle' that I'd only be entitled to the records requested if 'the information is relevant for the purpose of enabling the requester to exercise a right that maybe breached, rendered unenforceable or weakened by the non disclosure'. And as hard as one looks, nowhere in PAIA does one find entitlement to records of a public body excluded by reason of being 'beyond [the requestor's] personal circumstances'. It's just made up out of thin air, once again.
31. The so-called 'principle' by which 'we were guided' bobs up at the very end of the letter in paragraph 8. My request for records is 'declined' for the further reason given that 'it is not relevant to you exercising any right you may have in law' – only it's a 'test', a 'principle' that has no bearing on a request for records from a public body, as PAIA makes clear, and the court in the National Teachers Union case plainly stated.
32. And as the Supreme Court of Appeal underscored in Mittalsteel SA Ltd v Hlatshwayo [2006] SCA 94 (RSA): 'The issue before us is … whether the appellant at the relevant time and in creating the requested documents was a "public body" as that term is to be understood in PAIA. If it was then the respondent is entitled to the documents requested by it in terms of s 11 of PAIA. The section is headed "Right of access to records of public bodies". Subsection 11(1) provides that a "requester *must* be given access to a record of a public body if" (emphasis added) [in the judgment] (a) the requester complies with all the procedural requirements of the Act and (b) access to the record is not refused in terms of any ground set out in the provisions of PAIA dealing with the records of public bodies. None of these provisions is applicable to the

respondent's request, and compliance with procedural requirements is not in issue.' (j.mp/bKUmCW)

33. Despite the obstacles I encountered due to (a) LASA's failure to publish a PAIA manual on its website (a stale version of the manual was stuck under a bright new cover and posted on the website some weeks after I'd raised this problem with the SAHRC), and (b) CE Mpho Mphasha's failure to respond to my emailed enquiry about the identities of LASA's information officer/deputy information officer, I duly complied 'with all the procedural requirements of the Act' (per Mittalsteel) and I was and remain accordingly entitled to the records I requested.
34. As to the first excuse manufactured for not complying with the Act – '(i) your request for information [sic: for records] goes beyond your individual circumstances and extends to information on third parties, (ii) the information on third parties does not fall within the section 46 category above' – a glance at the list of records that I seek will show I wasn't asking for 'information on third parties'. (Bundle, pages 59– 68). This is because I have no interest in any 'information on third parties' whatsoever.
35. What I require – and it's a relatively small part of my request – are records of communications with certain third parties or sworn confirmation, as PAIA requires, that such records don't exist, showing that contrary to what has been suggested to me such communications never took place.
36. To protect their privacy – if privacy really was the issue rather than a false pretext for refusing my request – records of communications to and from third parties have only to 'be edited by blanking out the name of any third party whose privacy would otherwise be infringed by disclosure', as Brand JA put it in Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk [2006] SCA 32 (RSA). (j.mp/cHDY5D)
37. The particular records of communications with third parties or lack of them will be probative in establishing that my constitutional rights have been violated. By a public legal body professing to serve the Constitution.

38. And since the ramifications of this are awesome to contemplate, it seems this is why Vedalankar should have strained to seize upon this most peculiar, manifestly untenable pretext for refusing my entire request for records, the great majority of which have nothing to do with third parties by any stretch of the imagination.
39. Since Vedalankar's provision of the records I requested could not conceivably 'involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about a third party', as Section 34 (1) of PAIA puts it, the provisos in Section 46 cited and discussed in paragraph 3 of Vedalankar's letter are perfectly irrelevant.
40. But even if it were relevant, Section 46 would anyway require my access to the records for the reasons that '(a) the disclosure of the record would reveal evidence of … a substantial contravention, or failure to comply with, the law … and (b) the public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the harm contemplated in the provision in question'.
41. The fundamental premise of my records request, supported by the evidence I present, is that the disclosure of the records would indeed reveal further documentary 'evidence of … a substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with, the law'.
42. Here I'm referring to the Constitution and to the Acts I've cited prohibiting discrimination on unlawful grounds in the democratic era, including by reason of 'conscience and belief' and because, motivated by these, I 'campaign for … a cause'. (Bundle, pages 2–4, paragraphs 6–15 and pages 34–36, paragraphs 56–65) And by reason of race, unless justified by the provisions of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and the reported cases elucidating its practical application. I'm referring also to Acts and regulations, mentioned below, governing the operation of public bodies.
43. As for 'the public interest' – proviso (b) of Section 46 – the public have a clear interest in the disclosure of the records in this case, because they have a fundamental interest in having the certain assurance that they will not be

subject to illegal discrimination of any form when applying for employment with a public entity responsible through Parliament to the people of South Africa. It's clearly in the public interest that any breach of constitutional rights by publicly accountable institutions, especially those within the sphere of justice and constitutional development, be exposed. The hard won political gains of justice and human rights for all citizens of our country are jeopardized if a major public entity whose purpose is to secure justice for those citizens can subvert and undermine those very principles of justice and human rights without being held accountable.

44. With the 'tone' of Vedalankar's letter 'set' in the first half of it (cf. paragraph 10 above), it will not surprise you to learn that the second half only goes downhill.
45. In paragraph 6 of her letter, Vedalankar alleged the 'explanation' of why, after I'd been selected and recommended by the KwaZulu-Natal regional professional selection board on 12 November 2009 for appointment as Senior Litigator at the Pietermaritzburg Justice Centre, she and Nair moved to terminate the recruitment process – 'immediately' was the word used – in July, eight months later, thereby preventing your assessment and approval or disapproval of my selection and recommendation. (Bundle, page 103, paragraph 6.7 and page 104, paragraph 7)
46. Vedalankar's statement of the alleged financial reason for the abortion of my recruitment just prior to the confirmation or otherwise of my recommended appointment was 'provided to clarify the position and to definitively address your suspicion that your right to a fair administrative process is threatened, breached or may be rendered unenforceable'. (Bundle, page 104, paragraph 8)
47. It was intended to allay my conviction – founded on the evidence already available, weighed with the probabilities – that certain members of LASA's Management Executive Committee have illegally discriminated against me for exercising my basic civil liberties motivated by my 'conscience and belief' and guaranteed in the democratic era by the Bill of Rights in Chapter Two of the

FORM A

REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO RECORD OF PUBLIC BODY

(Section 18(1) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000))

[Regulation 2]

FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE

Reference number:

Request received by (state rank, name and surname of information officer/deputy information officer) on (date) at (place).

Request fee (if any): R .....

Deposit (if any): R .....

Access fee: R .....

SIGNATURE OF INFORMATION OFFICER/DEPUTY INFORMATION OFFICER

A. Particulars of public body

Legal Aid SA

Vidhu Vedalankar
Information Officer,
National Office
29 De Beer Street
Braamfontein

B. Particulars of person requesting access to the record

(a) The particulars of the person who requests access to the record must be recorded below.

(b) Furnish an address and/or fax number in the Republic to which information must be sent.

(c) Proof of the capacity in which the request is made, if applicable, must be attached.

Full names and surname : **Anthony Robin Brink**

Identity number : **590225 5116 081**

Postal address : **1 Boast Street, Eshowe 3815, KwaZulu-Natal**

Fax number : **086 672 0776**

Telephone number : **035 474 0145**

E-mail address : **arbrink@iafrica.com**

Capacity in which request is made, when made on behalf of another person:

N/A

C. Particulars of person on whose behalf request is made

This section must be completed only if a request for information is made on behalf of another person.

Full names and surname : **N/A**

Identity number : **N/A**

D. Particulars of record

(a) Provide full particulars of the record to which access is requested, including the reference number if that is known to you, to enable the record to be located.

(b) If the provided space is inadequate please continue on a separate folio and attach it to this form. ***The requester must sign all the additional folios.***

1. Description of record or relevant part of the record:

2. Reference number, if available:

3. Any further particulars of record:

See annexure

E. Fees

*(a) A request for access to a record, other than a record containing personal information about yourself, will be processed only after a **request fee** has been paid.*

(b) You will be notified of the amount required to be paid as the request fee.

*(c) The **fee payable for access** to a record depends on the form in which access is required and the reasonable time required to search for and prepare a record.*

(d) If you qualify for exemption of the payment of any fee, please state the reason therefor.

Reason for exemption from payment of fees:

N/A

F. Form of access to record

If you are prevented by a disability to read, view or listen to the record in the form of access provided for in 1 to 4 hereunder, state your disability and indicate in which form the record is required.

Disability: **N/A**	Form in which record is required:

Mark the appropriate box with an "X".

NOTES:

(a) Your indication as to the required form of access depends on the form in which the record is available.

(b) Access in the form requested may be refused in certain circumstances. In such a case you will be informed if access will be granted in another form.

(c) The fee payable for access to the record, if any, will be determined partly by the form in which access is requested.

1. If the record is in written or printed form -

X	copy of record*		inspection of record

2. If record consists of visual images -

(this includes photographs, slides, video recordings, computer-generated images, sketches, etc.)

	view the images	**X**	copy of the images*		transcription of the images*

3. If record consists of recorded words or information which can be reproduced in sound -

	listen to the soundtrack (audio cassette)	**X**	transcription of soundtrack* (written or printed document)

4. If record is held on computer or in an electronic or machine-readable form -

	printed copy of record*		printed copy of information derived from the record*	**X**	copy in computer readable form* (on compact disc)

*If you requested a copy or transcription of a record (above), do you wish the copy or transcription to be posted to you? **A postal fee is payable.**	**YES**	

Note that if the record is not available in the language you prefer, access may be granted in the language in which the record is available.

In which language would you prefer the record? **English**

G. Notice of decision regarding request for access

You will be notified in writing whether your request has been approved/denied. If you wish to be informed thereof in another manner, please specify the manner and provide the necessary particulars to enable compliance with your request.

How would you prefer to be informed of the decision regarding your request for access to the record? **By email**

Signed at Eshowe on 9 March 2015

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

ANNEXURE: RECORDS REQUIRED

1. Legal Aid South Africa's (LASA's) insurance contract with Camargue in relation to Durban Labour Court case, Brink v LASA, D529/11, and Brink's petition to the Judge President of the Labour Appeal Court, DA21/14 – which insurance company CEO Vedalankar stated in her report to the Board about the case on 31 October 2014 was 'managing the matter'.
2. LASA's claim on Camargue upon Brink's referral of his case for trial.
3. All enquiries and requests for progress reports about the case by Camargue, including about Brink's petition to the Judge President of the Labour Appeal Court.
4. All responses and reports by LASA to Camargue about the case, including about Brink's petition to the Judge President of the Labour Appeal Court.
5. All and any records vouching that deputy information officer Patrick Hundermark and other staff ('we') spent 187 hours reading 'the bundle of documents relating to the proceedings of the Labour Court' in the said referral; Brink's pending three 'applications in the Magistrate's Court' to compel LASA's compliance with PAIA; and the 'specific requests as outlined in' the annexures to Brink's Form A PAIA requests addressed to Hundermark, listing the documents required or, where they don't exist, sworn certification of this under section 23. (Quotations here are from Hundermark's demand of 3 February 2015 for payment of a one-third deposit of R900.)
6. All and any records vouching that deputy information officer Jerry Makokoane's 'team' spent 'almost 220 hours ... to read the bundle as referred in your footnotes to advise me with the gist of the background explanation.' (Quotations here are from Makokoane's demand of 25 February 2015 for payment of a one-third deposit of R1095.)

PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 2 OF 2000

23 Records that cannot be found or do not exist

(1) If-

(a) all reasonable steps have been taken to find a record requested; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the record-

(i) is in the public body's possession but cannot be found; or

(ii) does not exist,

the information officer of a public body must, by way of affidavit or affirmation, notify the requester that it is not possible to give access to that record.

(2) The affidavit or affirmation referred to in subsection (1) must give a full account of all steps taken to find the record in question or to determine whether the record exists, as the case may be, including all communications with every person who conducted the search on behalf of the information officer.

90 Offences

(1) A person who with intent to deny a right of access in terms of this Act-

(a) destroys, damages or alters a record;

(b) conceals a record; or

(c) falsifies a record or makes a false record,

commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.

INTERPRETATION ACT 33 OF 1957

4 Reckoning of number of days

When any particular number of days is prescribed for the doing of any act, or for any other purpose, the same shall be reckoned exclusively of the first and inclusively of the last day, unless the last day happens to fall on a Sunday or on any public holiday, in which case the time shall be reckoned exclusively of the first day and exclusively also of every such Sunday or public holiday.